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Abstract: 
This article provides a framework for understanding 
the dynamics between the disenchanting effects of a uniquely 
modern existential meaning crisis and a countervailing re-
enchantment facilitated by the techno-cultural movement of 
transhumanism. This movement constructs a post-secular 
techno-theology grounded in a transhumanist ontology that 
corresponds to a shift away from anthropocentric meaning 
systems. To shed light on this dynamic, I take a 
phenomenological approach to the human-technology 
relationship, highlighting the role of technology in ontology 
formation and religious imagination. I refer to examples of 
transhumanist religious movements to illustrate a new post-
humanist ontological grounding of meaning corresponding to 
a contemporary meaning-crisis that scholars are calling 
µneuroexistentialism.’ I then use the language of Charles 
Taylor and his work on secularization to frame these 
ontological developments. Ultimately, this article argues that 
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transhumanist religious expression represents a zeitgeist of 
post-secular re-enchantment.  
Introduction 
Scientists and philosophers alike are beginning to 
recognize a uniquely modern meaning-crisis driven by the 
contemporary techno-scientific milieu. The term 
“neuroexistentialism” has been coined to describe a new wave 
of existentialism characterized by the disenchanting effects of 
science and technology that pose a fatal challenge to 
fundamental conceptions of humanist-based groundings of 
meaning, forcing a reassessment of what it means to be human 
and producing a correlated meaning-vacuum as these 
fundamental conceptions of ontological grounding begin to 
shift. This article explores a countervailing meaning-
producing phenomenon of technological re-enchantment 
emerging from transhumanism, a growing cultural movement 
that seeks to transcend humanity through the radical use of 
technology. Despite the disenchanting effects of modern 
science and secularization, this techno-cultural movement of 
transhumanism1 has given rise to new techno-religions, 
stimulating religious imagination based on a new techno-
theology grounded in a shifted locus of meaning beyond the 
human subject.  
To support this understanding, I explore the case of 
emerging techno-theology arising from the techno-cultural 
movement of transhumanism. Transhumanism, with its 
1 Transhumanism is the idea that the concept of the human is 
open-ended and should be transcended through the use of 
radical technological interventions. Transhumanism shifts the 
locus of ultimate value from the human itself to a broader 
focus on consciousness, data, or information patterns, thereby 
seeing the human being as merely a limited manifestation of 
consciousness that should be technologically upgraded. 
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accelerationist ethos,2 is posing a challenge to a traditionally 
humanist model of meaning-making, facilitating new 
transhumanist forms of religious expression.3 Some of these 
forms of religious expression include the Church of Perpetual 
Life, the Turing Church, Terasem, the Christian 
Transhumanist Association, and the Mormon Transhumanist 
Association.  
With the phenomenology of perception as my point of 
departure, I describe the function of technology as a mediator 
to constructing models of reality, thereby providing a point of 
connection between meaning-making structures and 
technology. Ultimately, I argue that this ontological shift from 
human-centric meaning structures to the transhuman ontology 
has developed into a form of techno-theology, facilitating new 
modes of religious expression and post-humanistic meaning-
making. To begin talking about how technology is affecting 
the underlying ontological meaning-making paradigms of 
techno-culture, and thereby facilitating new forms of religious 
expression, I will briefly lay out a phenomenological 
perspective on the human-technology relationship. 
2 I use the term “accelerationist” to signify a belief in the 
historically inevitable process by which technology advances 
at a rapid, accelerating, and predictable pace. Such 
accelerationism and corresponding beliefs drive much of the 
enthusiasm for transhumanism and give strength to certain 
predictions of radical technological progress.  
3 Historian Yuval Noah Harari, although never using the term 
“transhumanism,” does outline a dichotomy of dataist vs. 
humanist ideologies in his book Homo Deus: A Brief History 
of Tomorrow. I argue that this dataist mindset can be clearly 
observed in the growing transhumanist movement. See: 
Harari, Y. N. (2017) Homo Deus: A Brief History of 
Tomorrow. New York: HarperCollins, p. 371. 
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Phenomenology of Technological Mediation 
According to Heidegger, entities like ourselves 
experience the world first and foremost as a world of 
meanings, rather than objects. This view challenges the 
objective Cartesian concept of an observer apprehending an 
array of objects in a context-independent world present-at-
hand, instead positing a phenomenologically-oriented 
ontology of Beings interacting with their environment in a 
ready-at-hand, context-dependent situation, always already 
equipped with value-predicates. In Heideggerian terms, 
Dasein is understood to be, “[«] in primary epistemic contact 
not with context-independent present-at-hand primitives [«] 
to which context-dependent meaning would need to be added 
via value-predicates, but rather with equipment, the kind of 
entity whose mode of Being is readiness-to-hand and which 
therefore comes already laden with context-dependent 
significance. (italics mine)”1 Heidegger outlines this 
distinction in the following way: 
What we µfirst’ hear is never noises or complexes of 
sounds, but the creaking wagon, the motor-cycle. We 
hear the column on the march, the north wind, the 
woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling« It requires a 
very artificial and complicated frame of mind to µhear’ 
a µpure noise.’ The fact that motor-cycles and wagons 
are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal 
evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-
world, already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand 
within-the-world it certainly does not dwell 
proximally alongside µsensations’ nor would it first 
have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide 
a springboard from which the subject leaps off and 
finally arrives at a µworld.’ Dasein, as essentially 
understanding, is proximally alongside what is 
understood.2 
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The world presents itself to us as ready-to-hand, in terms of 
potential uses, not initially as objects. We see the meaning of 
things in terms of their uses, and then infer intentional objects 
from this initial perception of significance. This structure of 
perception is an essential element in the framework of our 
mode of existing in the world and produces a world with a 
particular set of technologically mediated questions, goals, 
motivations, and values. For example, a person in Latin 
Christendom is going to have a fundamentally different set of 
questions and challenges in life than the modern Western 
person, because their world is constructed of fundamentally 
different networks of goals and values, mediated by the 
technological conditions of their reality.4 The technology of 
your world changes your world, and by extension changes 
your concerns to include the ultimate locus of meaning if the 
technological conditions are sufficiently transformative to 
challenge the underlying meaning-making structures. 
Therefore, the world is mediated, interpreted, and 
ultimately constructed through technology. This technological 
lens frames our perceptions, attitudes, and theories of our 
situation, structuring reality in a particular way. Technology 
mediates our world insofar as it immersively sets the scope of 
perceptual significance in which we orient our moment-to-
moment actions.5 The set of problems that make up our 
perception of the world is technological. 
4 The example of Latin Christendom is also famously used as 
an arbitrary point of historical contrast by the philosopher 
Charles Taylor when considering changes to secularity in the 
West. I am adopting this same point of contrast. See: Taylor, 
C. (2007) A Secular Age Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, p. 13.
5 In his book Homo Deus, Harari makes an argument
concerning the power of technology to set the bounds of our
understanding the challenges and opportunities available in a
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Technology and the Problem of Meaning 
Apart from the material impact of technology, we 
cannot separate the technological from our understanding of 
the world, since the world always already presents itself from 
within an ontology of technological framing. In this way, the 
problems and questions a Western individual self might have 
in, for example, Medieval Europe, were different from those 
of today because of the different technological realities 
bounding the limits of how reality is understood. Technology 
gives rise to the kinds of problems and potentiality with which 
the society is presently confronted in any given historical 
moment. The other elements of the society, such as its 
particular political structure, normative values, economic 
system, etc., are built upon the foundation of these 
technologically mediated concerns.  
 This role of technology implies a link between 
technology and meaning. The relationship between 
technology and meaning can be seen in the shifted grounding 
of meaning from the divine to the human that precipitated 
liberal humanism and its various corresponding political and 
economic systems of organization. Commenting on the nature 
of this transition, historian Yuval Noah Harari writes, “the 
central religious revolution of modernity was not losing faith 
in God rather, it was gaining faith in humanity.”3 For example 
we can see this transition in the work of John Locke, 
manifested in the Declaration of Independence of the United 
States, which is decidedly humanist in its foundational beliefs 
                                                 
given society, although without emphasizing a 
phenomenological approach. Likewise, much work has been 
done by Don Ihde in the area of post-phenomenology, 
producing a more nuanced and granular examination of the 
human-technology relationship. See: Ihde, D. (1990) 
Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth. 
Indianapolis, IA: Indiana University Press. 
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in the human as a free, individual self, worthy of inalienable 
rights. Although these rights originate from a divine creator 
who established natural law, the Deism fashionable at that 
time required only a small shift to eventually bracket off the 
divine agent, leaving only the superordinate µnatural law’ 
itself. 
With this newfound confidence and faith in humanity, 
the West committed to a new paradigm of locating ultimate 
meaning in humanist values. This was not a painless 
transition, as Nietzsche foretold with his proclamation of the 
µdeath of God.’ The experiments in different varieties of 
humanism, such as the communist and Nazi varieties, each 
held the same fundamentally secular belief in the primacy of 
the human as a source of meaning, although these systems 
disagreed drastically as to the scope and implications of such 
a commitment. 
However, the 19th century was one of religious 
diversity and fervor, at a time when certain secular and 
religious paradigms of meaning were competing to fill a 
meaning-vacuum formed by a rapidly changing world. The 
technological conditions of reality were changing, and there 
were several options from which to choose when deciding 
how best to adapt. Considering this process, Harari asks,  
Why did Marx and Lenin succeed where Hong and 
Mahdi failed" Not because socialist humanism was 
philosophically more sophisticated than Islam and 
Christian theology, but rather because Marx and Lenin 
devoted more attention to understanding the 
technological and economic realities of their time 
[«]4  
These reactions to the meaning vacuum fit with what 
philosopher Charles Taylor terms “the malaise of modernity” 
whereby our modern “spiritually unstable” milieu is 
characterized by a need for meaning.5 
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This makes sense in a context where technology is 
understood as playing a major role in the creation of meaning 
systems. Harari writes, “[«] technology often defines the 
scope and limits of our religious visions. [«] New 
technologies kill old gods and give birth to new gods.”6 In this 
way, Marx’s apt understanding of and adapting to the new 
technological realities of his time are what drove the powerful 
rise of Marxism. Old paradigms of meaning must 
continuously adapt to avoid becoming obsolete. As Marx 
wrote, “[«] mankind always takes up only such problems as 
it can solve since, looking at the matter more closely, we will 
always find that the problem itself arises only when the 
material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or 
are at least in the process of formation.”7 In this way, we can 
start to see a path by which technology can give rise to yet 
another shift in meaning-making, facilitating new forms of 
religious expression such as the new religions emerging from 
the transhumanist movement. 
Science, Technology, and Religion 
This is not to say that traditional µworld religions’ are 
not adaptable. Indeed, the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) is 
now compelling mainstream religious organizations to 
confront accelerating technological change. One example is 
the Southern Baptist Convention who recently issued an 
official declaration of principles concerning AI to address the 
growing relevance and social impact of accelerating 
technology.8  However, there are other voices in this 
discussion about the different possible ways contemporary 
religion can adapt to a technologically changing world.  
For example, Miroslav Volf writes about 
contemporary religion and globalization, including the 
corresponding issue of accelerating technological advance.9 In 
his book Flourishing: Why We Need Religion in a Globalized 
World, Volf points out that: 
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Unless we seriously misunderstand both globalization 
and world religions, the achievements of well-run 
globalization and the offering of world religions aren
t 
in competition with one another. More precisely: 
market-driven globalization in alliance with science 
and technology and globalization shaped by world 
religions aren
t exclusive alternatives and need not 
clash religions have their own contribution to make 
without diminishing the importance of science and 
technology.10 
In response to thinkers such as Volf, who object to the way in 
which technology and religion are pitted against each other in 
a competition for hearts and minds, a distinction must be made 
as to why technological adaptation is occurring. The 
assumption that science is functioning merely as descriptive 
or that technology’s function is merely providing material 
goods ignores the deeper ontological essence of technology 
and its potential effect on meaning making. Volf rightly points 
out that, “« to put the contest between religion on the one 
side and science and technology on the other in these terms 
presumes that religions, like science and technology, primarily 
aim at explaining and manipulating the world.”11  
This is a compelling position since it rejects the notion 
that religion is merely oriented at explaining the world, but the 
technologyreligion dialogue does not necessarily have to 
assume such a position. My point is not to reduce the function 
or role of religion to the level of scientific explanation, but to 
show how science and technology can shape meaning-making 
paradigms, going beyond the mere explanatory function 
typically granted them. Volf’s point is correct, but only if we 
disregard science and technology’s power to affect meaning-
making paradigms and to facilitate the transcendent. Volf 
writes: 
From the perspective of world religions, their central 
challenge isn
t to gain a competitive advantage over 
Antosca 
10
science and technology or at least maintain their share 
of the same “market.” World religions don
t stand or 
fall on their ability to deliver more and better worldly 
gods to more people than do science and technology in 
the context of globalization²goods like health and 
longevity, the necessities and conveniences of life, or 
explanations of how the world and things in it 
function. World religions stand or fall on their ability 
to connect to the transcendent realm and thereby make 
it possible for them to truly flourish, to find genuine 
fulfillment in both their successes and failures, and to 
lead lives worthy of human beings...12 
This objection is valid, but only by assuming a narrow 
conception of the role of science and technology in affecting 
meaning-making. Nevertheless, Volf’s point of view is 
necessary to present a valid counter-perspective that helps to 
draw the limits of such claims on science and technology’s 
impact on religion. 
For now, the liberal humanist paradigm of meaning is 
holding strong in modern Western society, but the prevalence 
of this paradigm does not necessarily correlate to the 
continued stability or longevity of the paradigm. History is rife 
with examples of paradigm shifts emanating from relatively 
small groups that represented indicators of how religion was 
changing. New transhumanist religions may be providing 
such an indication since they are founded on a shift toward 
fundamentally different paradigms of meaning. 
Shifting Paradigms: From Humanism to Transhumanism 
Prior to the ontological changes described in this 
article, the label given to the modern grounding of meaning-
making has been µliberalism,’ or the more general term 
µhumanism.’6 This signifies a modern Western sense of 
6 Both Harari and Taylor point to what I believe is the same 
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placing the individual human self at the center of our system 
of values. Charles Taylor adds to this the modern emphasis on 
following our individual hearts and desires. Taylor notes how 
the modern Western ethic of authenticity emerging after the 
Second World War placed special emphasis on a kind of 
humanism that gave precedent to the desires and feelings of 
the individual. Mantras such as µfollow your heart’ and µdo 
what feels right’ became widely popular, and when seeking 
answers to deep personal questions, your friends, family, or 
therapist will no longer advise that you seek the counsel of 
your priest to interpret the appropriate action, but rather ask 
how you feel, what would make you happy, and understand 
the solution in terms of how it best expresses the desire of your 
true self.13 
This modern ethic is built on an understanding of the 
human as an innately free and individual self, possessing both 
free will and innate value. The liberal intersubjective ideology, 
complete with its commitments to universal human rights and 
the resulting legal and political systems on which are 
predicated these ontological presuppositions are themselves 
upheld by prior essential presuppositions about reality.7 For 
                                                 
modern humanist locus of meaning when they speak of 
“humanism” or “liberal humanism.” 
7 The term µintersubjective’ has been used in many ways by 
philosophers and social scientists. I use the term 
intersubjective here in the same way as Harari to refer to a 
level of reality distinct from subjective and objective realities 
whereby an entity or concept emerges as a function of many 
individuals holding a common belief. Examples of 
intersubjective entities or concepts include corporations, 
imagined national communities, the value of paper money, 
etc. whereby the entity does not exist objectively, but rather 
exists as an intersubjective supposition. See: Harari, Homo 
Deus, p.146. 
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example, the structural integrity of this edifice requires the 
concepts of free will and a model of the self as individual. 
Only then are we able to derive an innate value of the 
individual and locate our sources of meaning in a conception 
of human agency based on the presupposition of free will.14 
 
Transhumanist Technology and Neuroe[istentialism 
The current grounding of humanist individualism and 
corresponding religious ultimate concerns are being 
challenged by certain scientific discoveries and technological 
advances. I label this set of scientific discoveries and 
technological advances as “transhumanist technology.”8  
 Since our liberal humanist worldview is based on a 
conception of the self with axiomatic presuppositions such as 
free will and individualism, we must look to transhumanist 
technologies that pose a potential threat to these particular 
elements of the contemporary humanist ethic. We can see that, 
if an empirically valid observation of the world contradicts 
some element of our presuppositions, that this will call into 
question the validity of that presupposition, thereby posing a 
fatal challenge to the conclusions which the presuppositions 
support. We can see that, given the implicit acceptance of the 
concept of free will, for example, that we do not simply 
believe in free will, but also hold some sort of basis on which 
to believe it at some level²the belief had to be perceived as 
being real, grounded in our understanding of reality, not 
arbitrary. It then follows that, insofar as our understanding of 
material reality changes, so too could our beliefs since our 
reliance on the concept of free will represents an elementary 
presupposition of the humanist liberal order. Additionally, 
                                                 
8 “Transhumanist technologies” is a term I use to refer to 
advanced technologies with transhumanist implications, i.e., 
that hold the potential to shift the mainstream cultural attitude 
towards that of transhumanism. 
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since such a belief is not arbitrary and must be seen as true, in 
a sense as corresponding to our reality, any challenge to the 
empirical truth-value of this claim could undermine its 
ultimate validity and ontological status, resulting in the above-
described disruption to the paradigm. 
Harari states that, “For liberalism to make sense, I 
must have one²and only one²true self, for if I had more than 
one authentic voice, how would I know which voice to heed 
in the polling station, in the supermarket and the marriage 
market" [«] If I look really deep within myself, the seeming 
unity that I take for granted dissolves into a cacophony of 
conflicting voices, none of which is µmy true self.’ Humans 
aren’t individuals. They are µdividuals.’”15 This reinforces the 
notion that our modern paradigm of liberal humanist meaning 
is grounded in large part on the idea of the individual self. 
Transhumanist technology is posing a challenge to this 
element of humanist grounding.  
Our modern paradigm of liberal humanist meaning is 
not merely grounded in a conception of the individual self, but 
also depends on that self as possessing a free will.16 In 2015, 
I asked the philosopher and linguist Noam Chomsky a 
question concerning the nature of the mind and its 
computability. Essentially, my question asked whether he 
believed the mind to be computable, in principle. Chomsky 
answered by stating: 
The mind is organized matter. It’s organized in a 
particular way, which we don’t understand, but we 
don’t understand much about bee communication. We 
don’t know of any physical reason to believe that the 
particular components of that organized matter are 
critical for its operation. It appears to be something 
about the way it’s organized that’s as far as we know. 
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So therefore, it could be emulated, presumably, in 
some other substances.9 
However, he went on to say, “[«] the major question²what 
is the puppeteer doing²that is one that we don’t even know 
how to address.” 9 
The µpuppeteer’ to whom Chomsky refers is the 
mysterious pre-conscious driver of our thoughts and actions, 
uncovered by recent discoveries in neuroscience.17,18 His 
analogy to a puppeteer is apt what he is alluding to is the fact 
that recent neuroscience has confirmed that intentional human 
action in the body is initiated in the brain prior to conscious 
awareness of the action. This means that when we make 
decisions we are actually acting on mobilizing forces prior to 
our consciousness of having made our decision to act, 
implying some kind of disconnect between the thing that we 
suppose is making our decisions²namely, our individual, 
free, willful µself’²and the thing actually making the 
decision, which seems to be much more diffuse and complex. 
This leads to a new understanding of how free-will functions, 
presenting an incompatible element of consciousness that our 
present humanist model of self cannot incorporate. These 
revelations serve as key drivers of this new wave of shifting 
meaning structures. 
The µpuppeteer’ study to which Chomsky referred 
concluded that, “«the outcome of a decision can be encoded 
in brain activity of prefrontal and parietal cortex up to 10 s 
before it enters awareness. This delay presumably reflects the 
                                                 
9 This question was posed to Prof. Chomsky through a live 
online correspondence facilitated by Twitter and broadcast 
live on the Internet as part of a public speaking engagement. 
My question was posed to Chomsky by the moderator. See: 
Chomsky, N. (2015) Chomsky and Krauss: An Origins 
Project Dialogue (official) - (Part 2/2) [Video File]. Retrieved 
from: https:www.youtube.comwatch"v tbxp8ViBTu8 
Technological Re-Enchantment 
 15 
operation of a network of high-level control areas that begin 
to prepare an upcoming decision long before it enters 
awareness.”19 Essentially, this new understanding shows that 
our actions are based on operations in the brain, the neuronal 
correlates to which we are able to empirically observe. The 
new reality emerging from this science tells us that free will is 
more complicated than our conception of an individual human 
agent making their own decisions. You, in an essential sense, 
are not making choices despite the intuitive phenomenology 
of perception and identity. 
There are many discrete examples of transhumanist 
technology presenting similar challenges to traditional 
understandings of the self and a corresponding grounding of 
meaning, from brain-machine interfaces to technologically 
enabled neuroscientific insights into the nature of perception 
and behavior. These innovations collectively are now giving 
rise to what some scholars are now calling 
“neuroexistentialism.” This can be understood in the 
following context: 
There are three kinds of existentialism that respond to 
three different kinds of grounding projects²
grounding in God’s nature, in a shared vision of 
collective good, or in science. The first-wave 
existentialism of Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and 
Nietzsche expressed anxiety about the idea that 
meaning and morals are made secure because of God’s 
omniscience and good will. The second-wave 
existentialism of Sartre, Camus, and de Beauvoir was 
a post-Holocaust response to the idea that some 
uplifting secular vision of the common good might 
serve as a foundation. Today, there is a third-wave 
existentialism, neuroexistentialism, which expresses 
the anxiety that, even as science yields the truth about 
human nature, it also disenchants.20 
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My argument is that transhumanist technologies are now 
providing an adaptive means of re-enchantment as a response 
to the challenge of third-wave neuroexistentialism by 
dissolving the “boundary of the mind” that Taylor describes as 
the defining feature of  what he calls the “buffered,” 
disenchanted self.21 
 
Techno-theology: Dissolving the PorousBuffered 
Boundary 
The question then becomes: what does the human-
technology relationship reveal in a world of rapidly 
accelerating transhumanist technologies" To understand what 
it means to be religious in an age of advanced technology, I 
frame the concepts of religion and the secular through the lens 
of Charles Taylor and his model of the µporous’ and buffered’ 
selves since these shifts in meaning making seem to tightly 
correspond to the shifts in meaning making he describes as 
having occurred in the prior God-centric to human-centric 
shift. The human-centric to transhuman shift can be seen as 
the next step in Taylor’s model. 
Taylor’s phenomenological approach starts with a 
presupposition that humans do not possess an innate, 
universal, unchanging nature, and that from epoch to epoch, 
the nature of how humans relate to the world can change. In 
comparing the two epochs of the years 1500 and 2000, Taylor 
sees two distinct versions of a conception of self and its 
relation to the world. In the older version of the past, he 
describes a way-of-being he calls the “porous self”²this term 
refers to the porous nature of the boundary between the self 
and the world. This is a conception in which the self, living in 
a pre-scientific world, is available to enchantment in a world 
full of mysterious spiritual forces. 
He contrasts this µporous self’ with the modern way of 
being, called the “buffered self,” which is a result of our 
disenchantment and newfound confidence in our ability to 
Technological Re-Enchantment 
 17 
find order in the world.22 The buffered self is “buffered” or 
“shielded,” in the sense that, in the modern “social 
imaginary,”10 the self is no longer available to the magic of the 
enchanted world²we are no longer porous we live in our 
own internal psychological and scientifically grounded reality. 
Here, Taylor links the concepts of porousness and 
enchantment. Taylor summarizes the key concepts of the 
porous and buffered selves in the following way: 
Almost everyone can agree that one of the big 
differences between us and our ancestors of five 
hundred years ago is that they lived in an “enchanted” 
world, and we do not at the very least, we live in a 
much less “enchanted” world. We might think of this 
as our having “lost” a number of beliefs and the 
practices which they made possible. But more, the 
enchanted world was one in which these forces could 
cross a porous boundary and shape our lives, psychic 
and physical. One of the big differences between us 
and them is that we live with a much firmer sense of 
the boundary between self and other. We are 
“buffered” selves. We have changed.23 
Taylor’s conception of the buffered self serves as a 
sophisticated model of secularization and serves as a way of 
understanding the implications of the emerging techno-
theology represented by transhumanist religions. In a world 
                                                 
10 Taylor’s concept of social imaginary can be defined as: 
“Different from an intellectual system or framework, “broader 
and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain 
when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode,” 
surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical 
terms, it carried images, stories, legends, etc.” See: Smith, J. 
K. A. (2014) How Not to Be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor. 
Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing. See also: 
Taylor, A Secular Age, pp. 171-172. 
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saturated by transhumanist technology, a new-wave 
neuroexistential meaning crisis, and corresponding 
countervailing materialist techno-theologies, it is meaningless 
to call the self “buffered.”  One must ask, from what is it 
buffered"  
There is no longer this kind of subjectobject dualism. 
There is no opposing realm from which the self is buffered. 
No longer is the subject buffered from the enchanted world 
because in the transhumanist world all is contained, in 
principle, within the same material space-time system, which 
itself is available to materially realized yet mysterious and 
functionally miraculous forces.11  
In a transhumanist world full of mysterious, albeit 
ultimately material forces, the barrier between the realm of 
phenomenal experience and the magical world is flattened²
the transhumanist world is completely available to the 
miraculous, and this is taken for granted. The entire world is 
contained within a common plane of reality available to the 
miraculous, albeit a materially-realized, functionally 
miraculous. This represents a cultural re-enchantment linked 
to technology. For transhumanist religions, a techno-theology 
of re-enchantment moves the locus of meaning through a 
transmutation of the human to the transhuman. 
In his book, A Secular Age, Charles Taylor lays out a 
critique of Weberean secularization theory by rejecting the 
traditionally conceived notion of secularization as an 
                                                 
11 My use of “miraculous” here is in a functional sense²I am 
claiming a miracle in this sense need not be supernatural, by 
definition, but be mysterious to the person or group 
experiencing the miracle. A miracle with a supernatural cause 
and a miracle with a perceived or expected material cause are 
functionally and phenomenologically equivalent as long as the 
element of mystery exists²they are experienced in the same 
way and serve the same function. 
Technological Re-Enchantment 
 19 
axiomatic result of a decline in religion²something Taylor 
describes as a mere µsubtraction story.’ Instead, Taylor sees 
our disenchanted secular world as a result of a complex 
process of buffering ourselves to the enchanted world, to 
which our Western ancestors of 500 years ago were porously 
open. The porous openness of the past resulted in theirs being 
an enchanted world. However, given the challenge of modern 
technological conditions, I claim that our uniquely advanced 
transhumanist technology is bringing back this state of 
enchantment by eliminating the boundary between the 
magical and the “real world” in which we act, thereby 
revealing the role modern technology plays in forming new 
paradigms of meaning and religious expression. 
The old world in which people of Latin Christendom 
acted was enchanted precisely because it was co-located with 
the world of the mysterious and miraculous²there was no 
boundary. The same now holds for transhumanists and their 
worldview as transhumanist techno-theology dissolves the 
secular boundary between the magical realm and the material 
world they are once again coterminous in a re-enchanted 
world of unlimited technological potentiality. Transhumanist 
technology serves to transfer the locus of meaning from the 
human to quantifiable data, thus combining the world of 
perceived technological wonder with the phenomenologically 
experienced self.  This self is no longer indivisible, but 
malleable and deconstructed. The world is, once again, 
porous.  
 
Transhumanist Hyper-connectivity: Collapsing 
Boundaries 
The transhumanist future expects a world of hyper-
connectivity. Some transhumanists, such as Singularitarians12, 
                                                 
12 Singularitarians are a subset of transhumanists who hold a 
belief in a coming event known as the Technological 
Antosca 
20
 
hope to connect their minds with machines, in line with the 
possibilities of the deconstructed, quantified, dataist 
conception of self. This would, in principle, collapse the 
boundary between an external world and the mind²a 
boundary that Charles Taylor defines as a necessary condition 
for the modern buffered self. Philosopher Slavoj äiåek agrees 
that the removal of this buffer would amount to a categorical 
shift in the human condition, noting, “[«] are we aware that, 
if this becomes a reality²this direct link between our brain 
and digital space [«] then in a way we will no longer be 
human because to be human means to have this minimal sense 
of separation between me in my mind and reality out there. 
Who knows what happens when this distance falls.”24 This 
minimal separation represents the metaphorical “buffer” of 
Taylor’s “buffered self”²the metaphysical vanguard 
defending against our return to the enchanted world. In a 
transhumanist ontology, Being will not be thought of in terms 
of the human but rather the transhuman of nebulous identity 
and patterns of data.  
In such a world, who or where is the puppeteer" This 
question highlights my connection to Taylor since his concept 
of the buffered self relies on the presence of a boundary 
separating our mental world and the external world. I am 
claiming that the transhumanist view implies the elimination 
                                                 
Singularity. This event has an eschatological dimension as it 
represents a transformative world-changing moment when 
technology accelerates at an explosive exponential rate, 
creating near-infinite levels of superintelligence and creating 
new possibilities that cannot currently be conceived of using 
current human minds. The Technological Singularity is 
therefore tantamount to an end-times event found in 
millenarian religious beliefs and includes a functionally-
miraculous transition to a state of permanent well-being 
through mysterious, unknowable technological processes. 
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of this distinction²it implies a world where we are directly 
linked to the deconstructed plane of data on which the 
miraculous technologies mysteriously function. 
 Similarly, in Taylor’s concept of the enchanted world 
of the porous self, people were likewise directly available to 
the mysterious and magical. Taylor writes, 
«in the enchanted world, the line between personal 
agency and impersonal force was not at all clearly 
drawn. We see this again in relics. The cures effected 
by them, or the curse laid on people who stole them or 
otherwise mishandled them. Were seen both as 
emanating from them, as loci of power, and also as 
coming from the good will, or anger, of the saint they 
belonged to. Indeed, we can say that in this world, 
there is a whole gamut of forces, ranging from (to take 
the evil side for a moment) super-agents like Satan 
himself, forever plotting to encompass our 
domination, down to minor demons, like the spirits of 
the wood, which are almost indistinguishable from the 
loci they inhabit, and ending in magic potions which 
bring sickness or death. This illustrates that [«] in the 
enchanted world, in contrast to our universe of 
buffered selves and “minds,” shows a perplexing 
absence of certain boundaries which seem to us 
essential.25 
Functionally, the enchanted world was one in which 
objects were tacitly understood to be imbued with potential 
mysterious power. What, essentially, is the difference between 
this and magical technology" As Singularity University13 co-
founder David Rose wrote, “Humans today are no less prone 
                                                 
13 Singularity University is a transhumanist educational 
institute co-founded by transhumanist Singularitarian thinker 
(and current Director of Engineering at Google, Inc.) Ray 
Kurzweil. 
Antosca 
22
 
to believe in potions and elixirs, magic stones fountains, and 
youth-giving spirits than the past.”26 As was the case in the 
enchanted world, objects have power. This reflects Taylor’s 
conception of the porous, which he understood as representing 
the enchanted world of Medieval Europe. This world is 
returning by transhumanist technology removing the 
Taylorian buffer, opening space for re-enchantment through 
techno-theology. 
 It is this notion of boundary that defines the modern 
buffered self. Taylor notes that, “The materialist fantasy, that 
we could for all we know be brains in a vat, being manipulated 
by some mad scientist, depends for its sense on this view that 
the material sufficient condition for thoughts of all kinds is 
within the cranium.” In other words, our buffered self depends 
on a conception of self predicated on a mind-centric world, as 
opposed to the enchanted world. Taylor writes: 
the crucial difference between the mind-centered view 
and the enchanted world emerges when we look at 
meanings in this sense14 that things only have the 
meaning they do in that they awaken a certain response 
in us, and this has to do with our nature as creatures 
who are thus capable of such responses, which means 
                                                 
14 Taylor’s sense of “meanings” here is in the context of a 
discussion of thoughts. Taylor writes: “What I am gesturing at 
with the expression “thoughts, etc.”" I mean, of course, the 
perceptions we have, as well as the beliefs of propositions 
which we hold or entertain about the world and ourselves. But 
I also mean our responses, the significance, importance, 
meaning, we find in things. I want to use for these the generic 
term µmeaning,’ even though there is in principle a danger of 
confusion with linguistic meaning. Here I am using it in the 
sense in which we talk about “the meaning of life,” or of a 
relationship as having great “meaning” for us.” See Taylor, 
Secular Age, p. 31. 
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creatures with feelings, with desires, aversions, i.e., 
beings endowed with minds, in the broadest sense.27 
Transhumanism represents a move away from the humanist 
ethic of the buffered, anthropocentric identity that gave rise to 
the “malaises of modernity” of which Taylor writes. Humans 
are now moving back to a pre-buffered state of enchantment 
by moving past the human, past the anthropocentric, having 
transitioned from a pre-humanistic structure, through a 
humanistic one, to the functionally enchanted post-humanistic 
structure of meaning. When you remove the world-mind 
substance boundary, you strip away the security of being a 
buffered self and are once again available to an enchanted 
reality. As Taylor explains, “Living in a disenchanted world, 
the buffered self is no longer open, vulnerable to a world of 
spirits and forces which cross the boundary of the mind, 
indeed negate the very idea of there being a secure 
boundary.”28 What has in modernity provided such a buffer is 
now becoming experienced as obsolete, returning to a porous, 
enchanted default mode. 
 
Conclusion 
The mediating function of technology, in which our 
world is constructed through a technological lens, 
characterizes the human-technology relationship. In a world 
of rapidly accelerating and increasingly immersive 
technologies, our meaning-making paradigms have the 
potential to deconstruct into a more transhumanist orientation. 
We see this early shift in the rise of transhumanist religions 
and third-wave neuroexistentialism. Some of these 
transhumanist religions include the Church of Perpetual Life, 
the Turing Church, the Terasem Faith, the Christian 
Transhumanist Association, and the Mormon Transhumanist 
Association, among others. Likewise, Singularitarianism 
poses a novel example of millennialism in the new light of 
techno-theology.  
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 Faced with accelerating transhumanist technology, the 
“buffer” of Taylor’s secularization model could be removed as 
a slide back into a “re-enchanted” state of living in an 
immersive world of technologically enabled enchantment 
occurs. This slide back to an enchanted world begins when we 
start to lose what Zizek describes as our “minimal sense of 
separation between me in my mind and reality out there,” and 
what Taylor describes as, “certain boundaries which are both 
familiar and crucial«”29  Transhumanist religions represent 
an early sign of this merger. 
The rise of transhumanist religions is a product of what 
Harari calls an intersubjective ideology of “dataism,” born 
from technological accelerationism and novel interpretations 
of key scientific discoveries, framed within the rich historical 
legacy of techno-millennial expectations in the West.15 The 
new transhumanist techno-theology is the result of a 
confluence of factors that include the material technological 
conditions able to generate key interpretations of reality that 
serve to challenge traditional paradigms of the self. In the 
midst of a wave of disenchanting neuroexistentialism, 
transhumanist techno-theology represents the deeply human 
quest for meaning adapted to the modern technological age. 
By relocating the modern ontological grounding, 
transhumanism is contributing to a post-secular zeitgeist of 
technologically mediated re-enchantment. 
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